Freedom And Independence - Zrzeszenie "Wolność i Niezawisłość", WiN, A Historical Brief By Dr. Janusz Kurtyka, Ph.D., (b. 1960 - d. 2010, Smolensk, Russia), Institute of National Remembrance, IPN, Poland.

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Part 1:

The emergence of an armed anti-communist resistance during 1944-1956, with particular emphasis on 1947, underscores the psychological condition of the Polish society at large. It was an act of desperate protest against the Soviet military might, brought upon Poland and its citizens under the banner of the conjured Communist Polish Workers’ Party (PPR). The public disclosure of the provisions agreed to by the “Allies” in Tehran and Yalta, which conceded to the Soviet political and territorial demands for Poland, dramatically altered the political landscape, leaving it under the Soviet sphere of control.

It became clear, that the possibility of a new world conflagration, between the Soviet Union - an ally of the Nazi Germany until 1941 - and the West, became very remote after 1944, and neither was there any hope for a sovereign and democratic Poland. Beginning in 1943, a tragic realization and moral dilemma accompanied the Polish political and military leadership both in Poland and in exile alike. (See the Katyn Forest Massacre here) The dilemma that accompanied them was both a moral responsibility to fight for the freedom of their country, and a sober realization that Poland was on its own and doomed to be defeated in the end. A decision was made to ready a new conspiratorial organization prepared for the event of the new Soviet occupation - that is, when the advancing Soviet Red Army ejects the Nazi forces from Poland. It was presumed as a certainty that the Polish Home Army (pol. Armia Krajowa – AK), fighting up to this point against the Nazi occupying forces, is both too large and at the same time penetrated by the Soviet intelligence services. Thus, a new conspiratorial organization called “Nie”, meaning “no” in English – Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych [DSZ] - was being organized in the spring of 1944 by the Colonel, later Brigadier General, August Emil Fieldorf, nom de guerre “Nil”. Fieldorf was a founder and the first Deputy Commandant of the Kedyw KG AK (Kierownictwo Dywersji, "Directorate for Diversion" of the General Staff of Home Army). The newly founded organization received a code-name “Nie”, short for “Niepodleglość”, or “Sovereignty”.

After receiving transferred to it cadres, from the disbanded on January 19, 1945 Home Army, the “Nie” began its activities. On orders issued by the Commandant of the Polish Armed Forces in Poland (pol. Komendant Sił Zbrojnych w Kraju), Leopold Okulicki, nom de guerre “Niedzwiadek”, the previously select and more nimble regional commands remaining in the underground, continued to operate under the same principles as their predecessor, the AK, or Armia Krajowa (eng. Home Army). The primary goal of this organization was to prepare itself for a “long haul” resistance, carried out by the means of:

1 - Self-Defense
2 - Propaganda Operations
3 - Intelligence, and
4 - Counter-Intelligence

The latter were to be conducted within the Soviet Red Army, and within the Soviet-led Polish communist units of the Polish First and Second People’s Armies commanded by Gen. Michał Rola-Żymierski.

While in principle, armed military operations were not to be carried out, yet the diversionary activities, among them liquidation of the most dangerous to the underground individuals and communist operatives, were. After the penetration of “Nie” by the Soviet and Polish communist intelligence services, the General Okulicki, “Niedzwiadek”, along with 15 other key leaders of the Polish Underground State were arrested by the NKVD (rus. Народный комиссариат внутренних дел Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del) on March 27 and 28, 1945. Thus, following orders from the Commander and Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, Gen. Władysław Anders, the “Nie” was disbanded on May 7, 1945. On the same day, the Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych (abr. DSZ - The Armed Forces Delegation for Poland) was established. It was to be led by the Col. Jan Rzepecki, nom de guerre "Ożog”.

The establishment of the DSZ indicated the abandonment, by the Commander and Chief of the Polish Government in Exile, of long-range goals and initiatives of “Nie” in favor of the more immediate needs. In addition to transferring functions of the conspiratorial “Nie”, and the so called, “AK w Likwidacji” (engl. “AK [Armia Krajowa – Home Army] in Demobilization”), one of the primary goals of the DSZ was to bring under its unified control all partisan units spontaneously emerging in response to the prevalent Soviet terror.

The DSZ was strictly a military organization that heavily borrowed from the operational doctrines of the AK and “Nie”. Thus, in a fashion similar to that of the AK, it operated in precise geographical areas divided into “Obszary” (Areas) and “Okręgi” (Districts). In an attempt to counteract the desire of the post-Home Army units to remain in the forests, the Commandant and Chief of the Armed Forces In Poland (Delegat Sił Zbrojnych w Kraju), Col. Rzepecki, appealed to the partisans to return to a peaceful life, but not at the cost of revealing their resistance affiliation to the communist authorities. Because of the on-going grand-scale pacification operations conducted by the NKVD and the Polish communist People’s Army, in the Lublin and Bialystok area, his appeal fell on deaf ears. The establishment by the communists of the Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej (Provisional Government of National Unity) in June 1945, led by the PSL’s Stanisław Mikołajczyk at the helm, further underscored the bleak political prospects for the armed units in the forests to peacefully disband and to return to normal lives. Following the reversal of the formal recognition of the Polish Government in Exile on July 2, 1945 by the Western Allies, the civilian conspiratorial structures affiliated with the Rada Jedności Narodowej and Delegatura Rządu na Kraj found themselves similarly abandoned and with no prospect for further support from the West. In this way, on August 6, 1945 the Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych was officially disbanded.

The prospect of outing themselves, or revealing their resistance affiliation to the communist authorities as a part of the UB-inspired scheme amnesty from July 22, (announced on August 2, 1945), brought about mixed feelings within the ranks of the DSZ. Around the same time, an appeal was also issued by the Commandant of the General Staff of the Home Army, and later, the Commandant of the Central District of the DSZ, Col. Jan Mazurkiewicz “Radoslaw”. Notably, the Mazurkiewicz was held in the communist prison at this time. The conclusions reached by all commanding officers of the DSZ were disturbing. While on one hand, the continuation of the military operations and mass conspiracy had no chance of success, conversely, the amnesty didn’t guarantee safety for those who chose to come out of hiding. Their outing could, and would, endanger those who chose to remain in the underground. [See “Communist torture methods” here] The Polish secret police -inspired “amnesty” was after all, only to allow the secret police to gain more intelligence about the resistance, and to aid them in creating detailed evidentiary records of all resistance members and their organizations.

Ultimately, the resistance was the very foundation from which the terrorized Polish society drew its strength to demand an end to all repressive measures undertaken by the communist regime. The confusion and uncertainty, promoted through skillfully orchestrated public appeals of the UB officers dressed up in Polish military uniforms, found some audience. For, they did “give their word“ as “Polish officers” while appealing for the unity in the name of “future”, and “better” Poland. They even allowed few carefully chosen representatives of the former Home Army to be part of the official "Komisja Likwidacyjna b. Armii Krajowej" (An Official Disbandment Commission of the Former Home Army). After all, they were also supported by a small number of well-known officers from the AK-DSZ who personally attested that the only way for the resistance members to became “legal”, was to come out of hiding. The commandant of the Delegation of Armed Forces for Poland, Col. Rzepecki, was internally torn himself. While he supported the secret demobilization of units under his command on one hand, he also resisted an open outing of his men, and remained himself underground. Many resistance units, particularly those in the central Poland and Silesia took advantage of this seemingly transparent “amnesty”. All in all, the number of men who came out of hiding is estimated to be nearly 45 thousand.

Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawisłość – WiN – Freedom and Independence.

The concept of transforming the DSZ military formation into a purely political organization having “Nie” as its foundation, surfaced at first among the underground units during May and June 1945 - that is, when the “Big Three” convened to prepare and implement the Yalta agreements. It was the Yalta concessions after all, that led to the establishment of the communist-controlled Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej – The Provisional Government of National Unity. The creation of WiN, was a result of the refusal of the underground to capitulate with Polish and Soviet communists. It was also a result of moral responsibility felt by the commanding officers of countless resistance units who steadfastly remained in the forests. In an atmosphere of prevailing communist terror, and ongoing military engagements against their forces, a need for a purely political organization with independent press emerged. Further more, the urgent need for false documents providing new “legal” identities to the underground soldiers who wanted to leave the “forests” was becoming critically urgent.

The idea of establishing WiN appeared already in the Col. Rzepecki’s appeal to the DSZ soldiers in the forests on July 24, 1945. It was further refined during several meetings in Warsaw and Krakow between the 2nd, 6th, 12th and 15th of August 1945. It is during this period that the first draft of the WiN’s political and ideological manifesto, authored by the Bolesław Srocki, further refined by Col. Jan Rzepecki, was formulated. After the disbandment of the DSZ, and further consultations with underground cells, on September 2, 1945, in Warsaw, the Association "Wolność i Niezawisłość" [“Freedom and Indepenence”] was formally established. The leadership of WiN consisted of Colonels Jan Rzepecki "Ożóg", "Ślusarczyk" (its Chairman), Tadeusz Jachimek "Ninka" (Secretary General), Antoni Sanojca "Skaleń" and Franciszek Niepokólczycki "Halny" (a subsequent Chairman of the Area “South”), Jan Szczurek-Cergowski, "Sławbor", "Mestwin" (Chairman of the Area “West”), Józef Rybicki, "Maciej" (Chairman of the Area “Center”), Janusz Bokszczanin, "Sęk" (a Deputy-Chairman, who shortly thereafter was sent to the West as an emissary).

During the 1945-1947 period, WiN was the largest Democratic Resistance organization still operating underground in Poland. It is estimated that during this period it had between 20 to 30 thousand members in its ranks. The WiN was established on the initiative of the leadership from the disbanded Home Army. While it did not have a status of an official government organization, it did however, provided reports and exchanged correspondence with the Polish Government in Exile via couriers. It wasn’t a military organization however, but rather a civilian association having abandoned through its official Charter the use of military ranks and titles. Furthermore, the WiN Charter called for an open democratic electoral process within its ranks – i.e. WiN officially abandoned the use of the word “Commandant” in favor of the title “Chairman” throughout its various organizational levels. The organizational areas such as “Obszar(y)” and “Okreg(i)” were however retained, and WiN focused heavily on forging forward with the secret demobilization of partisan units in the field. It was also shifting its activities into direction of propaganda, and infiltration of communist governmental bodies and their intelligence organization on behalf of the Sovereign Polish Government in Exile.

The political goals of WiN were to play the role of a depositor and organizer of the democratic underground, leading its men to take part in free elections – elections that at least theoretically, were guaranteed to Poland at Yalta. The WiN was also at an opportune time, to transfer its ranks, to the discretion of the democratically elected and sovereign government of Poland. As a result of the post-Yalta agreements, that allowed Poland to find itself under the Soviet sphere of influence, the possibility of implementing these goals was non-existent at best. In particular, since the Soviet secret police, the NKVD and its Polish clique installed at the Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego [eng. Ministry of Public Security – MBP) had rapidly developed and ran a sophisticated network of agents throughout the entire country. Via its structure, leadership, hierarchy, and an internal organization, the DSZ and WiN represented new evolutionary stages in the process of de-mobilization of the War-period structures of the Home Army on a nation-wide scale. We should note here, that other underground organization such as ROAK, KWP, Wileński Ośrodek Mobilizacyjny (eng. Wilno Mobilization Centre) were local in scope, and as such, had only local representation. The WiN leadership and its ranks were of course, conscious of the fact that they continued the objectives of the Home Army, a feeling widely shared and accepted by the entire Polish society during 1945-1947. It is this very perception that was shared by the entire Polish society that guaranteed favorable conditions for WiN to continue its conspiratorial activities and to flourish.

The subsequent Executive Offices of WiN were similarly penetrated and destroyed by the UB. The members of the I Executive Office, along with its Chairman Jan Rzepecki, were arrested already in October 1945 in Ludz. Having believed that negotiations with the UB are possible, Rzepecki made a fatal decision in jail to out the organization in return for guarantees that its members will not be persecuted by the secret police. As a result, the entire communications network with the West was compromised and destroyed. Further more, on October 9, 1945, the head of the clandestine information network code-name “Port”, Captain Żuk, nom de guerre "Barański" was arrested as well. While Żuk’s true identity was not immediately known to the UB, they discerned that he was also working for the General Staff of the II Polish Corp in Italy that was also linked to the leadership of WiN. Not surprisingly the Bezpieka didn’t intend to keep their promises. For these reasons, the other members of WiN’s leadership, who remained underground, opposed Col. Rzepecki’s position and decided to continue their conspiratorial work.

The II Executive Office of WiN was led by its then present Chairman of the Area “South”, Colonel Franciszek Niepokólczycki, nom de guerre "Halny". Niepokólczycki also managed to maintain the WiN organization in the Małopolska area, even though he, himself, was physically, primarily in the Upper Silesia area. The initiative and operations of WiN” under colonel “Halny” are not very well known. His immediate General Staff had most likely utilized an autonomous intelligence net, the so-called Intelligence Brigades (pol. Brygady Wywiadowcze). The Brygady Wywiadowcze conducted counter-intelligence activities against the communist underground units in the Małopolska region already in 1941, that is, during the period when the Soviets and Nazis were still formal allies. During the Nazi occupation of this area, the counter-intelligence units were part of both the so-called Administracja Zmilitaryzowana (eng. Militarized Administration) codename "Teczka", and the Delegatura Rządu (Government Delegation for Poland) that were co-creating the emerging structures of “Nie” in 1945, and in 1946. These units were directed by Edward Bzymka-Strzałkowski, nom de guerre "Wolski". Paweł Wieczorek-Lewandowski, nom de guerre “Dar”, on the other hand, headed the expansion of the Brigades’ activities beyond the Małopolska area in 1946. The arriving intelligence reports were analyzed and studied by the Biuro Studiów Brygad (eng. Brigades’ Studies Bureau). The important leadership positions overlooking analytical tasks were headed by Jan Kot "Janusz", Dr. Eugeniusz Ralski, PhD, and “Biały”, along with Wiktor Langner, “Szydłowski” who was responsible for the propaganda operations and publishing of the “Informator” (eng “An Informer”), the Brigade’s publication.

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